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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate order reversing the
magistrate court’s denial of Dace Huston’s motion to suppress.

This Court should affirm the

district court’s decision because it correctly concluded law enforcement violated Huston’s Fourth
Amendment Rights. The district court correctly concluded the totality of the circumstances
would have made it unreasonable for Huston to feel that he would be free to terminate the
contact with Detective Jason McIntosh. (“Det. McIntosh”) Further the district court determined
that the community caretaking function did not justify the encounter.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the early morning hours of February 7, 2019, Det. McIntosh was on patrol in Gem
County. (Tr. p.6, L. 5 – 22.) He saw headlights coming towards him, but never reached his
location. (Tr. p.7, L. 2 – 15.) At that point, Det. McIntosh got suspicious that the vehicle had not
crossed his location and went to investigate whether a crime was being committed. (Tr. p.21, L.
4 – 12.) Det. McIntosh drove to investigate and located a vehicle legally stopped in the pull-out
area and the headlights were still on. (Tr. p.11, L. 10-14.) Det. McIntosh testified that stopping
alongside the road at night constitutes reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. (Tr.
p.23, L. 25 – p 24, L 10.) Both the vehicle and Det. McIntosh were well off the road and away
from the lanes of travel for the road. (Tr. p.20, L. 3 – 5.) Det. McIntosh pulled behind the
vehicle, activated his emergency lights, informed dispatch of his location, and approached
Huston. (Tr. p.11, L. 16-19.) At that time, Detective McIntosh had no other justification to
make contact, other than his curiosity. (Tr. p.21, L. 3 – p. 22, L. 2.)
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As he approached, Det. McIntosh informed Huston that the emergency lights were on for
safety, and that he was free to leave at any time. (Tr. p.11, L. 19-21.) There was no evidence, or
inquiry about an accident or if Huston’s vehicle was broken. (Tr. p.6, L.6-7.) Det. McIntosh
quickly asked to see Huston driver’s license. (Tr. p.11, L. 21-22.) At that time, Det. McIntosh
smelled the odor of an alcoholic beverage on Huston’s breath and began conducting a Driving
Under the Influence investigation. (Tr. P 29, L. 1-8.) The interaction between Det. McIntosh
and Huston can be seen in its entirety in the on-body video submitted as State’s Exhibit A.
Huston filed a motion to suppress in front of the magistrate court. In denying Huston’s
motion, the magistrate concluded that no seizure occurred. (R., p. 65.) The magistrate found that
since Huston made no attempt to leave, and did not object, the encounter was consensual. Id.
On appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate’s denial. (R., 107-108.) The district court
held that Huston was seized because he was approached by an officer, with a side arm, who had
pulled behind Huston with activated emergency lights. (R., p. 116.) Ultimately, the district court
concluded that the detention could not be justified by reasonable suspicion or the community
caretaking function. (R., pp 118-21.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court correctly reverse the magistrate court’s denial of Huston’s motion to
suppress?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Reversed the Magistrate Court’s Denial of Huston’s Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court correctly reversed the magistrate on intermediate appeal. The

magistrate erred when concluding that no seizure occurred when a law enforcement vehicle
pulled behind Huston with its emergency lights activated and a uniformed sheriff’s detective
approached. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Det. McIntosh illegally seized Huston
despite the statement that Huston was free to leave, and the lights were on for safety. When
uniformed law enforcement activates emergency lights, stops, and exits a patrol vehicle to
approach a driver, a reasonable person would not jump in their vehicle drive away. Therefore,
the district court correctly concluded that Det. McIntosh’s conduct constituted an illegal seizure
and violated Huston’s rights.
The seizure cannot be justified by under the doctrine of community caretaking either.
There was no indication that Huston was in any type of distress. There was no inquiry into
Huston’s welfare. Det. McIntosh stopped behind Huston to investigate crime or curiosity.
Therefore, the community caretaking function of law enforcement cannot justify the seizure.
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B.

Standard Of Review
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the

magistrate division, the court reviews the magistrate court record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether
the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho
413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, the disposition
of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho
965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, the Court “reviews the magistrate court's
findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and
the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.” State v. Byrum, 167 Idaho 735,
476 P.3d 402 (Ct. App. 2020).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s finding of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Klinger, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 149 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
C.

The District Court Correctly Reversed The Magistrate Court Because Det. McIntosh
Illegally Seized Huston.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The stop of a vehicle by law
enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies.
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016). Evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment
protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of both primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered
4

and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual. State v. Baker, 141 Idaho 163, 165, 107 P.3d
1214, 1216 (2004) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382 2386 (1991)).
"A seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only `when the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.'" State
v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610, 612, 7 P.3d 219, 221 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.
16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904 (1968)).
When a defendant seeks to suppress evidence that is alleged to have been obtained as a
result of an illegal seizure, the defendant bears the burden of proving that a seizure occurred.
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004) (citing State v. Reese, 132 Idaho
652, 654, 978 P.2d 212, 214 (1999). "The test to determine if an individual is seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes is an objective one" requiring an evaluation of "the totality of the
circumstances." State v. Willoughby, 211 P.3d 91, 147 Idaho 482 (Idaho 2009) (citing State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007)). The use of “overhead lights is a
significant factor a court must consider when considering the totality of the circumstances..."
Willoughby, 211 P.3d 91, 147 Idaho 482 (Idaho 2009).
A seizure initiated through a show of authority requires words or actions, or both, by a
law enforcement officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering
him or her to restrict his or her movement. State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 820, 103 P.3d 430,
433 (2004) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690
(1991)). If a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the law enforcement officer, then the
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encounter is consensual. Page, 140 Idaho at 843-44, 103 P.3d at 456-57 (citing Nickel, 134 Idaho
at 613, 7 P.3d at 222).
1.

Det. McIntosh illegally seized Mr. Huston in the pull-out area.

Det. McIntosh illegally detained Huston in the pull-out area. The district court correctly
overturned the magistrate’s conclusion that the facts constituted a consensual encounter. (R. p.
115.) In determining the interaction constituted a seizure, the district court correctly evaluated
the totality of the circumstances. Det. McIntosh pulled his law enforcement vehicle in behind a
legally parked vehicle and activated his overhead lights. (Tr. p.11, L. 16-19.) Det. McIntosh got
out of his vehicle and approached Huston. (R. p. 115.) While Det. McIntosh approached, he
was in full uniform and carried a sidearm. Id. The subjective intent of Det. McIntosh for
activating his lights is irrelevant in the inquiry. Objectively, flashing law enforcement lights
means that a driver must stop. Huston obeyed all the Det. McIntosh’s requests. (R. p. 117).
There is no indication he heard that he was free to leave based on his compliance. Id.
Det. McIntosh’s emergency lights flashing is not the only element that should be present
for a totality of the circumstances analysis. While flashing lights are a significant factor in the
inquiry, there were other factors that led the seizure by law enforcement. Det. McIntosh pulled
behind Huston, activated his emergency lights, got out of the vehicle, and walked towards his
location. Det. McIntosh was in uniform and carried a sidearm. That, objectively, constituted a
seizure. These facts made Huston, or a reasonable person in his position, to conclude that he was
not free to terminate the contact. At that time, Det. McIntosh had no other justification to make
contact, other than his curiosity. Therefore, by making contact, Det. McIntosh illegally seized
Huston in the roadside pull-out.
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2.

Det. McIntosh’s Illegal Seizure Cannot be Justified by the Community Caretaking
Function of Law Enforcement.

The Appellant failed to demonstrate that the illegal seizure could be justified by the
community caretaking function for two reasons. First, Det. McIntosh stopped to investigate a
crime. Second, Det. McIntosh made no inquiry into Huston’s well-being, saw no signs of
distress, or saw no indication of an accident.

Therefore, the community caretaking function

cannot justify law enforcement’s actions in this case.
In analyzing community caretaking function cases, Idaho has adopted a totality of the
circumstances test. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997). The
constitutional standard is whether the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all
the surrounding circumstances. Id. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the public need
and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon
the privacy of the citizen. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992).
For the community caretaking function analysis to apply, an officer must possess a
subjective belief that an individual needs immediate assistance, although the officer may harbor
at least an expectation of detecting or finding evidence of a crime. State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho
301,304, 47 P.3d 1271, 1274 (Ct. App. 2002)(citing In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 818, 748 P.2d
401, 402 (1988)). The officers' activity must be one that is "totally divorced from the detection,
investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." State v.
Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 105 831 P.2d 942, 946 (Ct. App. 1991)(citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973)).
In State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 47 P.3d 1271 (Ct. App. 2002) the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the community caretaking function did not justify
law enforcement’s seizure.

The officer was on routine patrol and saw a vehicle in an
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unimproved pull-out twenty to thirty feet off the road. Id. at 302, 1272. The officer thought that
a vehicle had crashed or run off the road. He stopped in front of the vehicle, blocking any ability
to exit and activated his emergency lights. Id. As law enforcement approached the vehicle, he
saw two occupants. After checking with the driver of the vehicle to see if they were alright, the
officer smelled and located marijuana. At a suppression hearing, the magistrate court granted the
motion to suppress. The district court reversed on appeal.
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling. It concluded that the detention
of the passengers by law enforcement could not be justified by the community caretaking
function. The Court of Appeals noted that there were no indications that the vehicle’s occupants
needed assistance, and the vehicle was lawfully parked. Schmidt, 137 at 304, 47 at 1274. While
the officer may have had a subjective belief that the vehicle needed assistance, the correct
inquiry looks at all the surrounding circumstances. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 464, 54 P.3d 464 (Ct. Ap. 2002), the Court of
Appeals similarly concluded that the detention by law enforcement could not be justified by the
community caretaking function. Maddox, 137 Idaho at 141, 54 P.3d at 468. Law enforcement
was out on a routine patrol and met a driver out searching for a friend. Id. at 142, at 467. While
the car and driver proceeded to try to drive up a motorcycle trail, law enforcement followed and
activated his overhead lights. Id. The car stopped, and Maddox got out of the vehicle. Law
enforcement subsequently found out that Maddox was not supposed to be driving and eventually
discovered marijuana and methamphetamine in the vehicle. Id. At the suppression hearing, the
district court concluded that the community caretaking function justified the seizure. The Court
of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision. It determined that under the totality of the
circumstances, law enforcement had no justification for stopping Maddox.
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Like the justification in both Maddox and Schmidt, Det. McIntosh’s detention cannot be
justified by the community caretaking function under the totality of the circumstances. From his
testimony, Det. McIntosh was investigating a crime. He testified he stopped to make sure that
nothing illegal is happening. (Tr. p.24, L. 5-10.) He stopped to both make sure that the driver
was ok and to make sure that nothing illegal is happening. (Tr. p.24, L. 2-10.) Det. McIntosh
made no inquiry into Huston’s safety or well-being. (Tr. p. 22, L. 6-9.) There were no signs of
any accident or crash. (Tr. p.21, L. 16-18.)
There was no objective indication of an accident or that Huston was in distress.
Therefore, there is no justifying the contact with the community caretaking function.
CONCLUSION
Huston respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order reversing the
magistrate court’s order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 26th day of August, 2021.

/s/ Mark Coonts
Mark P. Coonts
Gem County Public Defender
Attorney for Respondent
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copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
ANDREW V. WAKE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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/s/ Mark Coonts
Mark P. Coonts
Attorney for Respondent
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